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Soon after the conclusion of World War Two, the historical 
annals bOgan, explaining how the Allied forces defeated Nazi 
Germany. Additional, highly classified wartime material has also 
been written into history after the expiration of the thirty year 
rule. Nevertheless, there still remains one wartime secret which 
has not been released. It is quite probable that this secret may 
never be fully divulged and that its official history will never be 
completely documented. It is the role Polish, French and British 
scientists played while working secretly with the military; 
specifically their method of penetrating the German enciphering 
machine now known as "Enigma." Over the six years of war, it is 
estimated that nearly ten thousand men and women worked 
secretly on breaking the German military ciphers. This intellectual 
mass was formed as a special adjunct of the British Code and 
Cipher School. The cover name for the department was Room 47, 
The Foreign Office, London. Moreover, the great importance for 
secrecy and also for fear of bombing necessitated the relocation of 
this group to a small town in Buckinghamshire called Bletchley, 
where a collection of wooden huts surrounded a large Victorian 
mansion known as: Bletchley Park (Whiting, p.44).
The wartime activity at Bletchley and its outposts was the 
most closely guarded secret of the war (Cave Brown, p.150). This 
secret was well kept until thirty-one years after the war had 
ended that a retired Royal Air Force Intelligence officer, F.W. 
Winterbotham, wrote The Ultra Secret. This book revealed for the
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tfirst time the exact nature of British wartime codebreaking and 
some of the consequences it had on the course of the war* It was 
not until October 1977, when the Official Secrets Act expired, that 
the Public Records Office in London released the texts of thousands 
of deciphered Enigma messages(Bennett. p.405) Prior to these 
revelations, one would have been lucky to find in the archives even 
the slightest reference to either "Enigma" or "Ultra."
Enigma was the name of the first device that the Germans 
used for the enciphering of their messages; later in the war 
similar but more complex machines were developed which added to 
the maze of encrypted messages "Ultra" was the British code- 
name for the intelligence which was derived from Enigma and the 
other machine ciphers used during the war.
The science of cryptography has a long and distinguished 
history. Almost as soon as humans learned to write, they devised 
ways to keep their messages secret; for example, enciphered 
writing is mentioned in Greek works such as the I l iad and even in 
The Old Testament. Julius Caesar often encrypted messages, 
substituting letters three places farther on the alphabet, to 
deceive enemies. Mary Queen of Scots was ordered beheaded after 
Queen Elizabeth’s chief spy intercepted and decoded Mary's letters, 
which revealed that she was plotting against Elizabeth(Tjme, p.55). 
The Arabs developed cryptography during the Middle ages but the 
real turning point for cryptography occurred with the invention of 
the telegraphic code by Samuel Morse in 1844 and with the
3establishment of dependable long-distance wireless telegraphy 
around the turn of the century (Kahn, 1967, pp.71, 93, 189).
The wire telegraph enabled military commanders to keep in 
touch with their forward units and in turn required special signal 
corps to be formed for this purpose. Enemy agents soon discovered 
that the wire telegraph could easily be tapped, so codes were 
devised to prevent the messages from being read. The telegraph 
had many limitations. It was a very cumbersome unit, only usable 
in a static war where wires could be laid and it was clearly not 
viable to communicate with naval ships at sea(Kahn, 1967, p.88)
The invention of wireless telegraphy greatly reduced these 
limitations; now military or naval units could be contacted at 
almost any distance and two-way instantaneous traffic be 
initiated (Winterbotham p.9). All this was at the cost of such 
traffic being available to an enemy who simply required a suitable 
receiving set (tuned into the proper frequency) in the safety of his 
own territory. Nonetheless, the advantages of mobility and 
simplicity gained by use of the wireless telegraph far outweighed 
its disadvantages As a result, the use of military and diplomatic 
messages via the wireless telegraph multiplied during the First 
World War. Knowing that the enemy would be listening though, 
required the sender of messages to use secret codes and ciphers on 
a massive scale. In turn, code-breakers (cryptanalysts) came on 
the scene, perfecting their skills on the plethora of signals which 
were so easily accessible. (Kahn, 1967, pp.189-92)
During the First World War managed to cut
Germany’s transatlantic cable (Kahn, 1967, pp.348-50). This forced 
the Germans to send most of their diplomatic traffic to the 
Americas by wireless, to which the British intercepted These 
messages were decoded by a team working in Room 40 of the 
Admiralty building. As the war continued, Room 40 penetrated 
German codes with the aid of a German naval codebook which was 
salvaged from a cruiser that had sunk in the Baltic seas. One of the 
greatest achievements b  ^ this team was in solving the intercept of 
the "Zimmerman" telegram, which was greatly responsible in 
bringing the United States into the war upon its disclosure (Kahn, 
1967, p.266; Whiting, p 43)
After the war, the wartime work of Room 40 was made public 
in Britain and undoubtedly noted elsewhere It was apparent that 
the type of codes used during the war, which relied on the 
substitution of words or phrases by code-groups of letters, could, 
however large, eventually be compromised. The reason was simply 
repetition. Given sufficient messages in a certain code, the 
cryptanalysts could later reconstruct the code and recover the 
original text from known phrases (Kahn, 1967, p 381)
Additionally, forms of address such as "Field Marshall." "To 
Commanding Colonels," or even "Good luck," would provide a key. 
There was also the possible danger that codebooks would fall into 
enemy hands (Winterbotham, p.8). Moreover, the sheer volume of 
military traffic posted an almost insuperable problem of logistics
in the drawing up, printing and distribution of thousands of 
different cddebooks There was also the time-consuming and 
redundant process of encoding and decoding the messages which 
was not practical for a military unit under fire
The history of cryptography took a dramatic leap forward 
with the work of an American, Edward Hebern (Lewin, p.34) In 
1915 he had become fascinated by cryptography and devised a 
simple machine-generated code based on the then very new 
electrical typewriter. The keys were, in reality, switches When 
an 'A' was pressed, an electric circuit was completed, current 
flowed to an electromagnetic actuator, and a mechanical type 
hammer printed the letter A' Hebern simply rearranged the wiring 
so that the ’A' key printed, for example. R' and an 1 ' was 'S’, and so 
on. As a result, a message read 'Send Ammo' would possibly print 
as 'LTWG RJJUV The importance of this early electromagnetic 
enciphering was its simplicity of operation, for, with the audition 
of suitable switching circuits. 'LTWG RJJU' could be then typed out 
to print the original plaintext 'Send Ammo' The machine was 
reversible and very quick, encoding and decoding took no longer 
than the time needed to type the message. The messages encoded 
by Hebern machines could be transmitted by Morse code to a ship at 
sea and typed on to an identically-wired typewriter, which would 
easily decode them and in turn encode a reply.
The codes generated by Hebern typewriters are those known 
as "mono-alphabetic substitution" and, although secure from casual
readers, would not pose a half-way competent cryptanalyst any 
difficulty in their breaking (Kahn, 1983, p.57). The codebreaker, 
given such a message of reasonable length, would make a frequency 
analysis of the letters or figures of the encoded text. All western 
languages have a characteristic repetition rate of letters whatever 
the content of the text. The order of letter repetition of English is. 
e,a,o,i,d,h,n,r,s,t,u,y,c.f,g.l,m,w,b,k.p,j,v,q,x,2 (Kahn, 1967, pp.381- 
2) .
Letter-frequency analysis is the foundation upon which 
crytanalysis is based. It would not take the codebreaker long to 
penetrate a simple substitution cipher, for e' is by far the most 
common letter in English. Vowels would soon be recovered, as 
would key consonants and before long enough of the plaintext would 
be deciphered to enable the gaps to be filled from the sense of the 
message.
To avoid the characteristic give away' of the letter 
frequency, it would be necessary to change the encoding so often 
that frequency analysis would be impossible, or at least very 
difficult. Hebern was aware of this and in 1917 began to 
experiment with a second encoding machine using rotors which 
switched the connections of his electric typewriter each time a 
key was pressed, thus changing the entire code alphabet (Van der 
Rhoer, p.55). After much work he produced his Electric Code 
Machine', U.S. Patent 1,683,072, Later, in 1928, Hebern even
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managed in selling some of them to the U.S. Navy (Kahn, 1967, 
pp. 415-16).
Although the machine looked like a typewriter, it was 
definitely not. It did not type anything but it had a keyboard with 
just twenty-six upper case letters arranged in the same order as a 
commercial typewriter keyboard. Above the keys on a sloping panel 
there were twenty-six letters printed on small glass windows, 
each with an illuminating bulb behind it, again arranged in the same 
order as a regular keyboard On the top of the machine, in the 
position that the rotor and paper would occupy on a standard 
typewriter, there were five rotors arranged parallel to the 
keyboard, Each rotor had twenty-six letters of the alphabet 
engraved on its circumference and each could be preset against an 
engraved datum. (Kahn. 1967. pp.417-20)
Each rotor was made of insulated material and had twenty- 
six contacts on either face, one for each letter The contacts were 
wired together m pairs in a definite pattern, each of the five 
rotors having a different wiring (Kahn. 1967, p 411). It was this 
internal wiring which performed the actual enciphering The 
operation of only a single rotor, might look like the following 
example: if the 'A' key was pressed an electric current tlowed via 
a spring contact brush to the 'A' contact on the first rotor, through 
the rotor's internal wiring, to emerge on the other side as, say 'R\ 
lighting up the R’ window on the front of the machine, if ‘A’ were 
pressed again, the rotor would advance one letter and the contact
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would pass the current via its wiring to, say, the ’H\ Then 'H* would 
light up on the front panel. Therefor, even a single rotor would 
provide twenty-six completely different cipher alphabets. Hebern's 
machine had five such rotors wired in series; when rotor one had 
made a complete revolution, rotor two moved forward one letter, 
when it had made a complete revolution, three advanced one letter; 
and so on. As a result, the Hebern five-rotor machine could 
generate nearly 12,000,000 different cipher alphabets, which is 
roughly twenty-six to the fifth power (Kahn, 1967, p 420)
To operate the Hebern machine, one needed to set up a 
'mamcode* which is a definite starting order for the five rotors, for 
example 'TBHWL', which would subsequently determine which of the 
ciphers was used first. As the plaintext was tapped out on the 
keys the code-letter equivalents would appear in the windows, to 
be copied down be a second cipher clerk Deciphering was 
accomplished by setting up the same mamcode TBHWL. The cipher 
text would then oe typed on the keys, with the plaintext appealing 
by letter in the windows. The Hebern machine had a great level of 
security due to the enormous number of cipher alphabets produced 
by the rotors. The question of frequency counts became a non- 
issue'. The time taken to break a Hebern code would have been so 
long as to render the intercepts useless, certainly during wartime.
Though it appears that Hebern's rotary machine was the first 
manufactured, it was not the only one to be conceived In 1919 
patent No. 10,700 was taken out by Hugo A'exander Koch of Delft
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9for a cipher machine which he called ’Geheimschrijfmachine': 
secret-writing machine (Kahn, 1967. p.402; Whiting, p.40). Koch 
did not actually construct his invention; but in all events, a 
German engineer named Arthur Scherbius, bought the patent rights 
and made the machine, renaming it 'Emgma'-a puzzle. Scherbius's 
machine was essentially similar to Hebern’s. though they seem to 
have been arrived at independently. The machine had three rotors, 
but the the third drum reflected the circuit back through the other 
two, giving the equivalent of six rotors This, however, was 
achieved at the cost of never being able to cipher a letter as itself. 
That is, an ’A* typed would never appear as an A m the encoded 
message. This was a seemingly small defect, but one which proved 
to be a serious weakness later
By 1923 Scherbius had his Enigma in production in his Berlin 
workshops and it was placed on public exhibition at the 
International Postal Union Congress and the Leipzig Trade Fair, 
where it was offered as an inexpensive, reliable means of 
safeguarding commercial cables and telegrams (Whiting, p.41) 
Although Scherbius was making an auspicious start to his venture, 
he was unknowingly attracting the attention of others outside the 
purely commercial and public realm. Discreet enquiries were made 
and the machine was withdrawn from the exhibition to reappear in 
the Berlin 'Chiffrierabteilung*, the Cipher Department of the 
Reichswehr. This was the small army permitted to the Germans
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under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The head of the 
department was Colonel Erich Fellgiebel. (Kahn, 1967, p.420-24)
After Fellgiebel’s examination, the Enigma machine was 
totally withdrawn from the commercial market. Its production 
continued, with significant improvements, but now solely for the 
German war machine. The arrival of the Enigma had been timely, 
for Germany was in political and economic turmoil, and the first 
stirrings of the Nazi party under Adolf Hitler were apparent. In 
November of 1924, Hitler published his frightening declaration 
tit led, Mein Kampf , my struggle. By the time Hitler had assumed 
power in Germany in 1933, Staff studies had already begun to 
sketch their ideas for a new form of warfare, termed Blitzkrieg- 
Mghtening warfare-a war of total mobility. This radical concept 
integrated massive motorized columns and armour, supported by a 
tactical air force; its successful deployment required fast, reliable 
communications that could only be furnished by radio. Enigma's, 
which were lightweight, battery-powered and rugged enough to be 
operated in the back of army signals trucks on the move, proved 
ideal (Whiting, p.9).
The Enigma that was issued to the German armed forces had 
initially three rotors and a plugboard that could make a final 
superencipherment (Bennett, p.400). German military officers 
apparently believed that its messages would be completely 
indecipherable to an enemy without an identical Enigma machine; 
and even with a captured Enigma, the enemy would have to know the
current ’maincode’ used to set up the machine, to break the code; 
an act which they believed, required an ability that few 
cryptographers possessed. As it turned out, their assessments 
were overly optimistic, for the initial secrets of Enigma had 
already been penetrated (Wmterbotham. p. 11)
The Poles, surrounded as they were by powerful potential 
enemies, had, between the wars, developed one of the most 
efficient Intelligence Services in the world. Their code and cipher 
bureau,BS4, based in Warsaw, had achieved some remarkable 
successes, including the breaking of the Russian codes used m the 
Battle of Warsaw in 1920 (Calvocoressi. pp 31-3). After this early 
success, the Poles broke the German Reichswehr ciphers, which 
they read without diff iculty until a certain date in 1928, when a 
new cipher began to be used which the BS4 cryptanalysts suspected 
was mechanically generated and which they could not break Soon 
after, BS4 realized that the source of the cipher that they could not 
read was some type of advanced copy of Scherbius s commercial 
Enigma. Fortunately, Polish intelligence officers had seen the 
commercial Enigma when it was on public exhibition and obtained 3 
rough understanding of its function. It was therefore vital that an 
example of the military Enigma be procured.
The account of how the first Enigma was truly obtained 
changes from source to source or differs from various books on the 
subject. One story explained by Sir William Stephenson in his 
biography, A Man Called Intrepid, explains how the Polish
underground attacked a German convoy; obtained an actual military 
Enigma; replaced a typewriter in its place; and blew up the military 
truck, so as to appear that the Enigma was destroyed in the attack.
If accurate, it appears that the deception worked, but most 
historians regard Stephenson's biography as more of a "history- 
fiction" than a true historical account Therefor, while believable, 
this story should, nevertheless, be taken with a grain of salt.
Another such account, which is believed to be accurate, was 
told by a Polish ex-Signals officer The story states that on a 
Friday afternoon, sometime in 1929, an official from the German 
legation in Warsaw began to make urgent enquiries at the Railway 
Parcels Customs Office regarding a packing case consigned to the 
Legation from the Foreign Office in Berlin. He demanded that it be 
cleared through Customs immediately, and such was his anxiety 
that the Poles became suspicious, and thinking (correctly) that a 
mistake might have been made in Berlin and that something had 
been sent by ordinary freight that should have been transported in 
the Diplomatic Bag. The story explained that the persistent German 
official was informed that the parcel had not yet arrived and that 
the Customs Office was about to close for the weekend. (Kozaczuk. 
pp. 16, 25-31)
The Customs officers then contacted Polish Military 
Intelligence, who lost no time in opening the case. In the box was a 
brand-new military Enigma. Over that weekend, experts from BS4
12
examined the machine thoroughly before it was skilfully repacked, 
to await collection by the Germans on Monday (Ibid, p.34).
The examination of the Enigma gave the Poles valuable 
information; in particular, the internal wiring of the three rotors, 
and also the addition of the plugboard (called a Stecker by the 
Germans), which provided a final superencipherment (Bennett. 
p.400). It was clear that the military Enigma was an advance on 
the civil version and it was obvious that to keep pace with its 
developments, exceptional cryptanalysts would be required, 
involving advanced techniques in higher mathematics BS4 
therefore recruited three brilliant young mathematicians from 
Poznan University, a German-speaking region of Poland (Bennett, 
p.401; Kozaczuk, pp. 1 -3>.
One of the trio, Marian Rejewski. had a remarkable analytical 
mind; moreover, he had been sent to Gottingen University in Saxony 
for post-graduate training in most recondite higher mathematics 
pertaining to group and permutation theory and statistics, an 
essential skill for cryptanalysts (Kozaczuk. pp.4,12) The second 
member, Jerry Rozycki, was very different and would be able to 
offer bril l iantly imaginative solutions to problems (Ibid, 4.12).
The third, Henryk Zygalski, complemented the other two. He was a 
diligent, steady tmkerer, capable of exploring every possible 
avenue tirelessly (Ibid, 4,9,12), In 1932, after four years of 
training, they began work with BS4 on the Enigma intercepts. They 
were to begin breaking the codes in approximately four and a half
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months. This was a remarkable achievement, even though they did 
receive outside help. This assistance came from the French 
Service Renseignements-lntelligence Service (Kozaczuk. p.279). 
They were able to supply BS4 and the trio with certain mformat'on, 
from a German informant, on ciphers, including document' relating 
to the secrets of the Enigma machine.
When the Poles broke Enigma in 1934, the German code clerks 
were simply setting the three drums according to a prearranged 
schedule, as set out in the Army cipherbook, copies which the 
French Intelligence had previously obtained. However, from the 
moment that Enigma became general in the German forces, the 
machine was constantly redeveloped. To continue to read the 
ciphers, more than purely mathematical techniques were required. 
BS4 came to the conclusion that several copies of the current 
Enigma were essential if they were to be able to continue to crack 
the German messages.
The Polish copies were based on the .uiown commercial 
model, with the additions which the examination of the Enigma m 
Warsaw Customs had revealed, and aided by mathematical analysis. 
The actual machines were built under conditions of great secrecy 
at the AVA telecommunications factory in Warsaw and were used 
by BS4 from 1934 (Kozaczuk, pp.25-28) They worked well for a 
time, but in October of 1936 the Germans began making changes.
The superencipherment plugboard was enlarged. In 1937 the 
’reflecting’ rotor wiring was altered and the keys, that is the
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initial setting of the three rotors, were no longer copied from a 
book; instead, a 'repeated indicator' technique was used. Now the 
codebook gave the operators the plugboard connections and the 
rotor settings , which was achieved by twisting the outer ring of 
the rotors, on which the twenty-six letters of the alphabet were 
engraved. Each of the three rotors would be differently set Having 
done this, the operator would place the rotors in the machine and 
set up the 'ground setting’ , that is the key or starting position of 
the three rotors as they appeared in the rotor windows on the top 
of the machine. The 'ground setting’ key would be dependent on the 
radio 'net' (or frequency) of the sender; these would be different 
for each unit and would be changed every month pre-war. or three 
times a day during the war (Kozaczuk, p 29-31)
The following is an example of this process suppose that the 
'ground setting' key was AAA an obvious combination, but one that 
will be used for clarity in this example The operator, having set 
the key. would then choose at random three letters, and repeat 
them: SOXSOX (Bennett, p 401). This might be encoded by the 
Enigma as WRJKBT. The operator made note of this, then set the 
three rotors to SOX and encode the message by tapping out the 
plaintext on the Enigma's key's As he did so. a second cipher clerk 
noted down the cipher text in five-letter groups When the 
encoding was complete, the message would be sent by radio in 
Morse code. The signal would begin by identifying the sender and 
the recipient by their radio call-signs, the message would start
with SOXSOX and then continue with the five-letter groups of the 
enciphered text. When the entire message was received, it would 
be passed to the code clerk for decipherment He would obtain the 
plugboard connections, the rotors and key of the net. AAA , from his 
codebook; he would then tap out 'WRJKBT' on his Enigma; This 
would decode as SOXSOX. the three random letters (repeated twice) 
that the encoding clerk had used. SOX would then be set up on the 
three rotors and the enciphering text tapped out on the keyboard 
with the German plaintext emerging letter by letter in the 
illuminated windows, and subsequently taken down by a second 
clerk (Bennett, p.400).
To enable the cryptanalysts of BS4 to recover the Enigma 
ciphers, the Poles built an electro-mechanical device which 
Rozycki named a ’bomba' (Kozaczuk. pp.53-61). The machine ran 
through all the possible settings of the three drums until settings 
were found which deciphered the message on the Polish built 
copies of Enigma. Precisely how they worked is not altogether 
clear, but they produced results, though they had certain 
drawbacks. In the first place, they were expensive to construct, 
and one bomba was required for each rotor setting; because of the 
reflection through the rotors, six bombas were needed for a given 
Enigma key. Secondly, they did not perform the entire operation; 
there was a complementary aid known as ’the light table’ . This 
was, as the name implies, an ilium mated table on which large 
perforated sheets of card were placed, one' on top of another; they
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were then manipulated in a certain way until holes appeared where 
registration occurred, which represented possible drum settings 
(Kozaczuk, p.237).
The Polish cryptanalysts of BS4 were able to improve their 
techniques, reaching a pe3k in the first six months of 1938 as 
German military traffic increased almost daily. However, their 
remarkable achievements came to an end in December of 1938. On 
this month, Germany issued each Enigma machine with two 
additional rotors, so that the three operational rotors were now 
selected from five (Calvoccressi. p 26) Since each rotor setting 
required a bomba, the additional rotors increased the number of 
bombas needed by a factor of ten. from six to sixty, and of course a 
highly trained staff to operate them The Poles of BS4 simply did 
not have the time or the resources available from their peacetime 
budget. The Enigma traffic was once more unreadable (Ibid, p 34- 
6 ) .
Fortunately, a French intelligence officer, Captain 
Bertrand,had foreseen, at least in part, that the Poles would be in 
need of help. Just before the appearance of the two extra rotois, 
he approached the British with a proposal that they should co ­
operate with the French (Kozaczuk, p. 16). The British Secret 
Service, which is one of the most withdrawn of all clandestine 
organizations, was to say the least indecisive; but in the 
inevitability of a new war with Germany in the not so distant 
future, the suggestion was not entirely dismissed (Kozaczuk,
p.207). Encouraged, the Captain Bertrand sent Britain samples of 
their intelligence documents and also hinted at the Polish success 
in penetrating certain German ciphers, by the use of advanced 
cryptanalytic techniques
Subsequently, a meeting was set up between representatives 
of the comparable intelligence services of the Polish. French and 
British (Bennett, p.401; Kozaczuk. p 56). The meeting began with 
the Polish revealing the extent of their penetration of Enigma and 
the problem posed by the German's introduction of the additional 
rotors. A long discussion followed and two possible courses of 
action emerged. The first, put forward by a representative of the 
French Intelligence, was that a ’deception gambit' should be played, 
involving the idea that the Germans would be supplied with 
information, through their contacts, that the five-rotor Enigma 
ciphers were ’blown’. The French argued that the Germans would 
then drop the system as insecure. However, even if this succeeded, 
it would only be temporary, for the Germans would hardly drop all 
ciphers and a new improved form of Enigma would inevitably 
appear.
The Polish took the position that a better course of action 
would be a new tripartite effort to break the five-rotor cipher 
This alternative was adopted by the representatives and the three 
intelligence services agreed upon the following: 1. The Poles 
would continue their mathematical work on the Enigma ciphers; 2. 
The French would maintain their intelligence contacts with their
18
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agents ir Germany; and 3. The British would use their greater 
resources to design and construct at least sixty bombas to break 
the five-rotor Enigma The Poles offered to help the British all 
they could; their mathematicians revealed all they knew and plans 
of the bombas were also supplied. But perhaps the most valuable 
gift was two examples of the AVA' copies of the German Enigmas, 
which arrived in Paris after the meeting. (Kahn, 1991, pp 79-81)
A French intelligence officer travelled to London on 16 
August 1939, accompanied from Paris by a British Embassy’s 
diplomatic courier, carrying a Polish AVA Enigma in the Diplomatic 
Bag. Meeting them off the boat tram at Victoria Station was 
Menzies, then deputy and later head of MI5 (Kozaczuk, p 60)
Sixteen days later Germany invaded Poland and the Second World 
War began (Whiting, p.41-2, Win’erbotham, p 11),
Ironically the Poles, who had done more than any other nation 
to break the Enigma cipher, were to end up as the first nation to 
suffer from ‘Blitzkrieg’ , the highly mobile war that Enigma made 
possible. Within days it was obvious to the Polish General Staff 
that the country was bound to be overrun; the Intelligence Section, 
including BS4, was evacuated from Warsaw and. by the final 
collapse at the end of September, had reached Romania, which was 
neutral at the time (Caivocoressi, p.57; Kozaczuk, pp 70-1). The 
journey proved rather treacherous because the train in which they 
travelled was attacked constantly from the air, and the Poles 
reluctantly decided to destroy their bomba, since there was a
distinct possibility of it falling into German hands and 
compromising the entire team. Eventually though, :he whole 
prewar BS4, which included the vital three mathematicians, 
Rejewski, Rozycki and Zygalski, arrived safely at the French 
Embassy in Bucharest.
From there, the cryptanalysts immediately went on to Paris, 
with some, if not all, of the Enigma engineers from the AVA 
factory. By mid October 1939, the French had collected them 
together and established them at the Chateau de Vignolles (code- 
named 'Bruno'), in a small town some forty kilometers north of 
Paris (Kozaczuk, pp 82-3). Here, as team 'Z'. they worked as a 
specialized decoding unit within the French's Service 
Renseignements (Ibid, p. 118). A British Intelligence 
representative, Captain McFarlane, was also attached 
Several replicas of the AVA Enigma were constructed. To preserve 
secrecy, the work was contracted out to light engineering works 
around Paris, no one concern being given enough of the machine to 
have any idea of its purpose. The final assembly was supervised by 
an engineer from the AVA factory
The possession of the Enigma machine was of little value 
without the bomba, though team Z continued the work of the 
mathematical analysis of intercepted Enigma radio traffic, which 
was very heavy at this point (Bennett, p.401). The team were 
helped when Alan Turing visited 'Bruno' in January 1940, Turing 
brought with him sixty complete sets of the 'perforated sheets'.
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Each set consisted of twenty-six sheets with 1000 ales punched 
through; according to a Polish cryptanalyst, these were improved 
versions of the Polish originals, which Turing had made to cope 
with the five-rotor Enigmas (Kozaczuk, pp 96*8) No information 
has since been released as to how they were actually used, but once 
again, the ciphers were broken and the decodes were passed to 
Allied Intelligence until 14 June 1940 By that date, the Germans 
had broken through the Allied lines and were within a few 
kilometers of ’Bruno'. The Chateau de Vignolles was hastily 
evacuated with the most imoortant files, the perforated sheets and 
the Enigma machines (Kahn, 1991, p. 115)
To practically everyone, it seemed probable that the German 
forces would overrun the whole of France in the course of the next 
few weeks. Nevertheless, a French Intelligence officer managed to 
set up the codebreaking group in a similar operation in part of 
unoccupied France near Algiers, which was a French colony at the 
time. The building they were housed in was called Chateau Fouzes, 
but those ‘ in the know’, referred to it by the code-name 'Cadix'. 
Additionally, the team was renamed 'Unit 300' in case any mention 
of team 'Z' was left at 'Bruno' (Kozaczuk, p 113). The French 
maintain that during their period of operation, that the 
cryptanalysts at 'Cadix' broke 673 German signals, mainly those 
sent to the Afrika Korps (Ibid, p 118); lacking a teleprinter circuit, 
these intercepts were sent to London via a radio transmitter which 
the British had delivered to Lisbon, where the French collected it.
The British end of the radio net was operated by Poles from a house 
in the North London suburb of Stanmore (Kahn, 1991, p.231).
Unit 300 continued its work until 8 November 1942, when the 
Germans occupied the whole of France. A few days later a German 
motorized column entered 'Cadix', but it was empty. The unit was 
now dispersed south; some-Rejewski and Zygalski among them- 
managed to escape over the Pyrenees into Spam, where clandestine 
organizations conveyed them, through Gibraltar, and onward to 
Britain (Kozaczuk. pp. 135-6, 138-40). Some were not so lucky. 
Rozycki had gone down with the SS Lamoriciere when she was sunk 
in the Mediterranean earlier in 1942 (Kahn, 1991, p.117). Others 
were caught en route to Britain and were subsequently interrogated 
by the Gestapo. The chief engineer of 'Unit 300' was among those 
and eventually died in a German concentration camp. Not one of the 
captured Poles, though subjected to the most rigorous 
interrogation by the Gestapo, gave away so much as a hint that 
Enigma had been penetrated. Many eventually took their secrets to 
their unmarked graves in German concentration camps (Kahn 1991, 
P 117; Kozaczuk, p.211). With the dispersal of 'Unit 300’, the 
Franco-Polish attack on Enigma came to an end; they had done a 
great service to the Allied cause, though in fact the major work on 
the German ciphers had already passed from France to England 
(Bennett, p,401).
Soon after the tripartite meeting in the summer of 1939, the 
British cryptanalysts of the Government Code and Cipher School
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(mockingly called 'the Golf Club and Chess Society) had been 
evacuated to Bletchley Park where work began to solve the Enigma 
cipher. Bletchley Park was a rather large and ornate house with 
red bricks and timbered glass of the late Victorian style. There 
were twenty or more rooms in the two-storey house, entered 
through a pretentious porch The mansion had spacious green 
lawns, a croquet lawn and a ha-ha, a sunken boundary fence that 
was invisible from the house and gave the illusion of unbroken 
space. This was a favorite place for the scientists to sit and eat 
their lunch (Winterbotham. p 13) The man eventually appointed to 
head this establishment was a naval officer. Commander Edward 
Travis, and a discreet recruiting campaign was implemented, 
largely among the mathematicians of Cambridge University 
(Whiting, p.131). Among the first recruits were Gordon Welchman 
and Alan Turing.
Turing was a brilliant scientist. In 1936 he had published a 
classic paper on ‘computable numbers', now recognized as the 
theoretical basis of the modern computer (Kahn, 1991. p 92). He 
was most likely one of the British delegation who attended the 
tripartite meeting in 1939 and subsequently given complete details 
of the BS4 bomba. By the outbreak of war he was at Bletchley Park 
working on a British version of the bombe'. It is not clear how 
much it owed to its Polish prototype, but it seems to have been a 
big step forward, and Turing's contribution was considerable, for
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he had two essential qualifications; he excelled at mathematics 
and mechanical engineering (Bennett, p.401-2).
Gordon Welchman, was also a Cambridge mathematician 
recruited (Kahn. 1991. pp.97-8). He received a letter asking him if. 
in the event of a war. he would be willing to serve his country He 
replied that he would and subsequently was requested to attend the 
Code and Cipher School in London for an initial indoctrination. Alan 
Denniston was head of the school at the time and asked Welchman 
to report to Bletchley Park on the first day of war. should it come,
Upon the outbreak of war. Welchman arrived at Bletchley, and 
Denniston sent him to join Dilly Knox, then chief British 
cryptanalyst. Turing and others in a building known as ‘the cottage', 
which was part of the stables behind the old mansion 
(Winterbotham, p.14). Other members of the group were on loan 
from the armed forces. Namely, J.H. Tiltman from the Army and a 
brilliant mathematician, Josh Cooper, who was borrowed from the 
Air Force. Three strange additions to the group were; Oliver 
Strachey, Benjamin Britten and Dick Pritchard. They had no 
military, mathematic or engineering skills, but excelled in the 
field of music theory. Winterbotham mentioned that it struck him 
how often the art of undoing other people's ciphers was closely 
allied to a brain which could excel both in mathematics and music 
(Winterbotham, pp.14-5).
By then, with the aid of the AVA machine, the group were 
beginning their work on the Enigma cipher. It is most likely that
additional copies had been made in Britain by that time Due to the 
vital gift of the Polish machine, the complicated internal wiring of 
the five rotors was known, and it fortunately remained virtually 
unchanged throughout the war. The technique of the plugboard and 
the setting of the keys were known in principle, but apart from 
some decodes (supplied possibly by the French or Poles) no Enigma 
messages appears to have been deciphered at Bletchley before 
Welchman joined. At the time of his arrival, not much could be 
done in the area of actual cryptography As a result, Knox didn't 
feel that he needed other cryptanalysts yet and sent him to work 
alone on radio call signs and 'discriminates*. As things turned out. 
this accidental move was to prove highly beneficial Welchman 
quickly realized that the radio call signs were m effect the 
addresses of the sender and recipient and the 'discriminates as 
Denmston called them, were the codes that the Germans used to 
indicate the vital keys in which that particular message had been 
enciphered. It now dawned on Welchman that they weren't really 
dealing with a cryptographic problem, but rather, they were dealing 
with the entire communications system that the Germans had 
developed for their Blitzkrieg (Kahn, 1991. pp 98-9). Here were the 
commanders talking to each other, reporting and getting their 
instructions from High Command. The radio call signs now were 
viewed as actual military units, not a radio station; and the 
’discriminates' made it possible to distinguish between different
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kinds of traffic that was being sent (Kahn. 1983, p. 10; Kozaczuk, 
pp 158-9, 295-7).
Although the British had yet to break Enigma, a simple 
analysis of the traffic which Welchn m  undertook with the help of 
the Navy's Y* intercept stations revealed the scope and complexity 
of the German armed forces' signals organization, which was by far 
the most elaborate system of military communications in the 
world in 1939 Without a quick, easy-to-operate and secure 
encoding system, radio could not be used; without radio there 
could be no Blitzkrieg It was as clear as that The only 
alternative to Enigma teat could offer total security would have 
been the ’one-time pad', and as stated earlier, this was not 
suitable because of the much longer time required for encoding and 
decoding. Additionally, the volume of enciphered radio traffic at 
the time made it logistically impossible to supply the needs of the 
German forces with disposable one-time pads (Wmterbotham. p.9).
Therefore, Enigma was the solution. Its penetration was now 
more important *han ever Welchman plotted the movements of 
units from their call signs and soon realized that once the secrets 
of the five-letter groups that formed the texts of the intercepted 
messages were broken, a huge organization, equivalent in numbers 
to the German army's Signals Corps, would be needed to deal with 
the landslide of coming Enigma intercepts The height of 
Cryptanalysts1 work now reach a level unheard of (Kozaczuk. 
pp.297-8).
With a new organizational plan in place to prepare for the up- 
in-coming onslaught of intercepts, the group at Bletchley got 
permission to start recruiting immediately. They took on a variety 
of skills; radio operators to man the intercept stations, females 
from the Woman s Royal Nava! Service (WRNS) to act as decoding 
clerks; foreign language specialists m German. Japanese, and 
Italian, mechanical and electrical engineers, statisticians, 
theoreticians, mathematicians and intelligence experts A 
complete organization that would eventually number 10.000 men 
and women who were sworn to complete secrecy (Bennett, pp 403. 
406 7; Calvocoressi. pp 3.45, Kahn. 1991 p 231. Kozaczuk. p 159)
Within a few weeks the basic organization was ready and 
waiting for thu moment when the cryptanalysts had broken the 
five-rotor Enigma ciphers This was an intimidating prospect The 
military Enigma used by the Army and Luftwaffe, had 10 to the 
twenty-f irst power of possible initial settings of the machine; for 
the Navy's Enigma, there existed the use of four operational rotors 
out of a possible eight, the figure would be 10 to the twenty-third 
power of possible settings (Bennett, p 402). As a result, even the 
possession of an Enigma machine was of little help
Nevertheless, the codes were broken. The principal aid was 
the bombe, which was a dangerous cover name to choose, since had 
the Germans discovered it they could have concluded that the atom 
bomb was being developed at Bletchley, which was well within 
their bombing range. Apart from the name, it is not documented as
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to how much similarity that the British bombe had with the Polish 
prototypes. It is. however, reasonable to assume that the British 
bombe worked very much more quickly than the Polish original and 
that the British machines were much larger objects (Kahn, 1991. 
pp 230-3) Dr Good, another mathematician who worked at 
Bletchley. stated that they were about ten feet high These objects 
were most likely the "bronze-colored Eastern goddesses' to which 
Wmterbotham refers in The Ultra Secret (Wmterbotharn. p 15). The 
bombes were not electronic, but rather electro-mechanical, In a 
real sense they were Enigma machines m reverse, but far more 
complex by simulating the three operational rotors many times 
over (Bennett, p 401). They had a plugboard on which a menu' was 
selected; this menu was really a set of alectro-magnetic 
instructions to the bombe which reduced the number of possible 
initial states of the Enigma machine from 10 to the twenty-f irst 
power, to a much lower, more attainable figure. The menus were 
drawn up in Hut 6 for the Army and Air Force, and in Hut 8 for the 
Navy. The menu selection was aided greatly by the Germans 
themselves; indeed, without that aid early on, the task could have 
been impossible.
It should be explained that there were very large numbers of 
Enigma machines issued to the German forces, a figure of 200.000 
has been mentioned, and they were in daily use encoding a 
tremendous volume of traffic, which meant that the messages 
contained the same phrases time after time. Examples of repeating
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phrases are: 'To Officer Commanding'. 'By order of the Fuhrer'. or 
even 'Heil Hitler'. Such repetition is 'the fuel for the fire' to 
cryptanalysts since, once decoded in one cipher, they provide 'keys' 
to others (Kahn. 1991, p.69). Weather reports also helped, for the 
European weather systems tend to move from west to east, thus 
the British knew in advance the sort of meteorological forecasts 
the German's would send, particularly to the Luftwaffe (Kahn,
1991, pp.190,229)
German cipher clerks unwittingly helped in several ways 
Often a headquarters signals officer would have to send in order to 
several units, each on a different 'net', each with >ts individual 
Enigma keys. The army used many of these nets. Incredibly, the 
men operating the machines would send an identical message 
enciphered in different keys (Kahn, 1991. pp 62-3). Thus, when 
Bletchley broke one of these they had a plaintext equivalent for all 
the other settings, not only for that particular message but for all 
subsequent ones, until the 'ground keys' were chained again. 
Additionally, the method of setting up the keys invited 
carelessness which offered valuable help to the codebreakers. As 
stated earlier, the operators had to think up three random letters 
to be tapped out twice on the machine; many used 'XYZ' or even ABC' 
or, contrary to regulations, the same three letters; some 
continually used their own initials or those of a girl friend, over 
and over again. The units of these men would become known from 
their radio call signs and Bletchley's Hut 6 would soon have the key
for the day (Bennett, p.401; Calvocoressi, p.34; Kahn, 1991, p. 112; 
Kozaczuk, p.42). There were other common practices which helped. 
For example, Q' is a letter little used in German, 'CH' on the other 
hand is very common and many units used 'Q' for 'CH', which made 
decipherment much easier. Moreover, there were no punctuation 
marks on the Enigma keyboard, so 'YY' was often used for stop.
The cryptanalysts also relied heavily on 'females' which were 
often present in the keys. Suppose SOXSOX were the 'random' 
letters an operator had used and they had encoded as WRTWQL; t -re 
a 'W' appears twice. When a letter appeared twice in the key cipher 
it was known as a female, if thirty or so of these females were 
received in the same key. the bombe's menu could be plugged up 
with a fair chance of decoding the messages (Kahn, 1991, p.70)
The Poles were the first to discover the technique, but the term 
was coined at Bletchley and originally meant an alignment of the 
holes on the perforated sheet which was used on the light tables. 
Turing, as has been noted, improved on the original light-table 
technique and adapted it to the bombe.
The Enigma machine itself helped. Because it reflected' the 
pulses through its three rotors, it could never encipher a letter as 
itself (Kahn, 1991, p. 113) This defect was also exploited by the 
British, who would send out an aircraft to destroy a known 
lightbuoy, one which marked a safe channel for U-boats to pass 
through perhaps. Then radio interception stations would be alerted 
to listen particularly for traffic from the relevant command; soon
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a radio message would be sent warning the U-boats, and the 
cryptanalysts would be fairly certain that the phrase 'the lightbuoy 
is gone' would appear m the text. Then, by comparing the plaintext 
German phrase with the cipher groups, they would look for a point 
in the message where none of the plaintext letters appeared in the 
cipher. Because of Enigma's inability to encode a letter as itself, 
that section would, with luck, be the cipher equivalent of the 
phrase (Kahn. 1991. pp.95-6) When that sort of information was 
available, it would be set up on the plugboard behind the bombe as 
part of the menu.
The bombes consisted of twenty-five to thirty sets of three 
rotors, which were wired in exactly the same way as the Enigma 
machines and also had the twenty-six letters of the alphabet 
engraved on their circumference Each set of three rotors was 
arranged vertically, one above the other, the too one representing 
the first rotor of the Enigma, the middle the second and the bottom 
the third (Kahn. 1991. pp 99-100) They were color-coded and were 
changed by the WRNS operators on instruction from Hut 6 or 6 The 
cryptanalysts could ascertain which three of the five rotors were 
in use, probably by some type of mathematical analysis of the key 
cipher or possibly from the presence of 'females' in the key.
The plugboard had many rows of jacks like a telephone 
exchange, except that the jacks were arranged in lines of twenty- 
six and each was labelled with a letter of the alphabet. The plugs 
were again, standard telephone exchange equipment, which enables
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the menu to be set up (Kozaczuk, p.20). Once the menu was plugged 
up and the correct rotors put in place, the machine would be 
switched on to commence its search
The rotors were electncalfy driven and clicked round 
interminably, mimicking the Enigmas When the first wheel had 
completed one revolution of twenty-six letters, the second one 
below it moved forward one letter, when this had completed its 
twenty-sis letters, then the third wheel started its slow rotation 
On completion of the third twenty-six letters, that trio of rotors 
would have tested no fewer than twenty-six to the third power 
offering more than 17.000 possible combinations (Calvocoressi. 
p.34). At the same time, the other thirty or so sets of rotors would 
be doing the same thing. However, when a set of rot^.o found the 
letter substitution that the ’menu' had programmed it to find, it 
would throw a switch; when all the rotors had completed their 
programme and the enciphered message had become decoded into 
its plaintext, the machine would switch off and the and the WRNS 
who operated it would report a ’stop' (Kahn. 1991, p 97) This could 
take anywhere from ten minutes to ten hours
It should be stated that the bombes were not, m themselves, 
decrypting machines; their function was to recreate the state of 
the enciphering Enigma (Kozaczuk, pp.53-4). If it was a ’correct 
stop', and not all were, then the message would appear as plaintext 
and the signal of ’reds up’ or 'greens up' would be sent on to 
Intelligence officers in Hut 3. The colors being messages to
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indicate to Intelligence, the anticipated importance of deciphered 
messages (Kozaczuk, p.293), The Enigmas which were used at 
Bletchley were British built and had the advantage over the German 
originals m that they printed out the decodes on strips of gummed 
paper, like a telegram, which were then stuck to a sheet of paper 
and sent to the intelligence huts for analysis.
It is not known how many bombes there were, some were at 
Bletchley. others were in the outstations' scattered around the 
countryside, usually in large country houses At the these houses, 
the machine rooms were staffed by WRNS who had volunteered for 
service, then sent to Bletchley or one of the outstations. where 
they were required to operate the bombes on an eight hour shift, 
for the duration of the war There were three shifts each m the 
twenty-four hour day (Kahn. 1991. pp.231-2).
The actual work of the cryptanalysis was conducted out of 
Huts 6 and 8 at Bletchley It was ^ere that the menu was prepared 
and also where the plugboard of the Enigma was solved This board 
was responsible for a very large percentage of the 10 to the 
twenty-first power figure of combinations but was apparently 
solved by another of Turing’s machines (Ibid, pp.94-5, 97)
The first decodes at Bletchley were made sometime around 
April of 1940 during the Norwegian campaign. From that time the 
quality and number of intercepts rose steeply and by May, when the 
Battle of France began, the codebreakers in Hut 6 were reading a 
significant portion of the Enigma traffic. However, this is not to
34
say that all the signals were broken; some were only partially 
solved and others not at all Certain keys took longer to recover, so 
a system of priority was used. In this instance, the traffic which, 
from its origin as revealed by direction-finding and the call signs 
used, was considered to be the most important was dealt with 
first, and given the color-code red (Bennett, p.405).
By mid May, the effectiveness of the Germans’ Blitzkrieg was 
all too clear. German tanks were continuing their advance across 
France . driving at top speed with commanders, in Signal Corps 
trucks, co-ordinating close-support attacks on the French troops 
with Stuka dive-bombers; and it was the Enigma machine which 
made it all possible.
The group at Bletchley intercepted and broke many of the 
enciphered radio messages as France was being overrun, but to the 
men in the Huts there was little excitement in their 
accomplishments, for the scenes revealed were rather grim The 
Allied forces were clearly unable to defend against the straight on 
advance of the German army. In a military sense, the battle was a 
defeat. Nevertheless, for the cryptanalysts in the wooden Huts at 
Bletchley, however bitter, it was still a victory; for the first time 
in years, codebreakers had been able to influence the tactical 
response of a battle.
The intelligence analysis of Enigma was accomplished in 
other huts at Bletchley, mainly Hut 3, where skilled interpreters 
pieced the information together (Bennett, p.403; Calvocoressi,
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p.55). Nothing was too trivial; everything, however small, was 
collated and filed in a huge card index containing hundreds of 
thousands of names, units, postings, supply requisitions, details of 
transfers, promotions, or even courts martial (Bennett, p 408-9) A 
transfer of one or more Air Force pilots could reveal an impending 
attack, possibly revealing the target. The card index grew until it 
was virtually the archives of the entire German Command 
structure. As the intelligence mounted, a special organization was 
developed to handle it It was distributed under the name Ultra’ 
and Special Liaison Units (SLUs) were formed by the RAF 
Intelligence officer, Captain Winterbotham (Calvocoressi. p 60. 
Wmterbotham, pp.20-1).
As the war progressed, the organization centered at Bletchley 
grew, and more and more German radio signals were intercepted for 
the codebreakers. The actual radio interceptions were made at 
several stations as far apart as northern Scotland, the Midlands. 
South Whales, and on the east coast Many of the stations in the 
small country homes, had their array of directional rhombic uenals 
hidden in foliage around the country side (Calvocoressi, pp.41*3)
At the time, approximately 600 girls of the WRNS worked m shifts 
around the clock taking down the faint morse signals from Germany 
and Occupied Europe. The sets were mainly communication 
receivers with highly selective crystal to enable the operators to 
cut out interfering signals It was a tedious job, for the signals 
♦hat were copied, day after day, with the greatest possible
accuracy, were to the operators a meaningless series of five-letter 
groups. Very important signals would be received on several sites 
as far apart as possible, in the hope that if one radio signal was 
fading or jammed by interference, it might be clear at another 
location. This also allowed cross matching of identical signals to 
check for accuracies and possible discrepancies. The intercepted 
messages were sent by dispatch rider or teleprinter over secure 
land-lines to Bletchley (Bennett, p.403).
The Ultra messages that were intercepted undoubtedly 
effected the conduct of the war. The Battle of France, as 
mentioned earlier, was one; the Battle of Britain, according to 
Winterbotham, was another (Whiting, p.47). He recalled talking to 
Air Marshal Dowding personally after the Battle of Britain in which 
Oowding said that it was the greatest help to him (through Ultra) 
to know what Reichsmarschal! Goering's policy was, because as 
Goering got more and more desperate, he gave orders to his fighter 
squadrons that they must bring the RAF fighters up to battle. The 
Lufwaffe then sent greater and greater formations of fighters over 
airfields to draw the RAF but Oowding only used a squadron or so to 
mast these attacks. The maneuver by the Luftwaffe failed, but by 
the beginning of September 1940 the strain on the RAF was 
becoming unbearable. Then, a deciphered signal came to Dowding, 
which told the Lufwaffe bombers to change from attacking the 
fighter airfields to the city of London. It was that change of policy
by Goering which Dowding credits to the survival of the RAF 
(Winterbotham, pp.44-7, 54).
Air Marshal Dowding was more than glad to utilize the Ultra 
intelligence. Much later in the war. the hard-nosed American 
General. Patton, was a great user of Ultra; he, like the German 
generals, had his signals truck travelling with his tanks, the 
difference being that his truck was receiving the decodes via 
Bletchley (Winterbotham, p.98). His British arch-rival, Field 
Marshal Montgomery, on the other hand, did not care for Ultra and at 
times ignored its intelligence (Winterbotham. pp.75, 78).
Some of the most exciting successes of Ultra 
were during the North African campaign, particularly with decoding 
of messages giving details of the routes of Rommel's Afrika Korps 
supply ships which were as a consequence sunk by the Royal Navy in 
large numbers (Bennett, pp.411-12). It has been said that the 
conditions were so favorable for the codebreakers during the North 
African campaign that at times the Allied Armies in Cairo had the 
Enigma telegrams before Rommel himself (Winterbotham. pp.25.
89, 71).
Ultra was also instrumental in confirming that Operation 
Sea-Lion, Hitler's plan to invade south-east England, was definitely 
off. Winterbotham immediately informed Churchill of this after 
the group at Bletchley deciphered a message from Berlin, giving 
orders to dismantle the aircraft loading ramps on a certain Dutch
airfield, which was probably to have been the staging site (Whiting, 
p.47,131).
Although the Ultra intelligence that was flowing from the 
Enigmas of the Army and Air Force was readily accessible, it was a 
different story with the German Navy. Possibly from their 
experiences during World War One, the German Navy were much 
more security-conscious than the other services, being aware that 
radio was the only possible link with their fleets at sea. So from 
the outset they had their o m version of Enigma ciphers, known 
generally as 'Key M'. There were in fact some thirteen different 
ciphers in use, of which the most important from the Allied point 
of view was Hydra, the cipher used by the operational U-boats in 
the North Atlantic (Calvocoressi, p.86; Kahn, 1983, p. 111;
Kozaczuk, p.201).
The Enigma machines used by the U-boats had. as noted 
earlier, four rotors to be chosen from eight, giving the 
cryptanalysts a figure of ten to the twenty-third power to cope 
with. German Naval cipher clerks were far better disciplined and 
made fewer mistakes. For a year between 1940 and the summer of 
1941, Bletchley failed to break Hydra. Patrick Beesley, who served 
in Naval Intelligence in the U-boat tracking room at the Admiralty 
in London during the war, has recounted in his book. Very Special 
Intelligence. how cipher materials and spare rotors were captured 
in 1941 from three German armed trawlers. The material was 
described, as usual, as ’of inestimable value', but the men in Naval
38
39
Hut 8 had still not solved Hydra when, on 8 May 1941, U-boat 110 
was captured following an battle off Greenland with the Royal Navy 
corvette Aubrretia and the destroyers HMS Bulldog and Breadway 
(Kahn, 1983. p.111). A boarding party managed to recover the 
Enigma machine, its rotors and the current cipher boo»s intact 
form the U-boat; a fact which pleased the Admiralty since the U- 
boat sank, from existing damage, while under tow to Iceland. 
Beesloy states that this chance-discovery enabled Bletchley to 
penetrate Hydra at last
Hydra was eventually replaced by another U-boat cipher, 
'Triton', which, with the aid of improved bombes and the experience 
gained with Hydra, was also broken by April 1943 (Kahn, 1991, 
pp. 185-6, 205, 216). The result was that the vital convoys could 
be rerouted clear of the 'wolf packs' of U-boats. The penetraJon of 
Triton also enabled the hunting down of Germany's milch cows', 
the fuel tankers for U-boats, to such an extent that every single 
one of them was sunk (Ibid, p.274).
Enigma was not the only cipher machine used by the Germans; 
there were others. One such machine was known in Germany as the 
Geheimschreiber. secret-writing machine (Kahn, 1983. p.52). It 
was only used for the highest grades of traffic, from the German 
Foreign Office to keep in touch with embassies in still neutral 
countries or for Hitler's directives and broad strategic plans to 
distant commands (Ibid, p. 111-12). The Enigma ciphers were not 
regarded as secure enough for this purpose. The essence of Enigma
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was its use tactically where speed was of the essence. The 
Germans had considered that the problems of solving the ciphers, 
though not totally impossible, would take so long that by the time 
they had been broken the information recovered would be Militarily 
useiess. Foreign Office dispatches and strategic plans, on the 
other hand, were of far longer relevance and importance
Fortunately the scientists at Bletchley were also successful 
at penetrating this cipher machine. What made there work 
successful was the invention and design of the first electronic 
computer (Kahn, 1963, p. 117) The name given to the first 
computing machine at Bletchley was the Colossus (Kozaczuk, 
pp.162-63). By 1943, egan producing results almost 
immediately. The exact nature of Colossus' function has not been 
revealed but ' e intelligence obtained was considerably vital and 
was also, for that reason, given the 'Ultra' priority (Cave Brown, 
pp.276-77).
With the official release of Ultra intelligence, the extent of 
the Allied penetration of the German command structure may now 
become more clear. The influence of the cryptanalysts and other 
scientists at Bletchley on the conduct of the war was profound. At 
the vary least it must have saved the lives of many Allied soldiers. 
It had to be used with great caution however; during the war the 
users of 'Ultra' were ordered never to take action based on the 
intelligence that could not have been attributed to other sources 
such as reconnaissance or interrogation of prisoners (Benr ett,
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pp.413-14). If the Germans realized that there messages were 
being decoded on such a broad scale, could have led to the 
discontinuance of Enigma and consequently a loss in Bletchley's 
service.
Thus the bombes and Colossus continued to provide the 
German secrets to the fast day of the European war. when they fell 
silent for the first time in over four years. The cryptanalysts and 
mathematicians went back to their universities, picking up on the 
research they abruptly abandoned at the onset of the War; some 
scientists went into the emerging field of computers.
The work accomplished and the technologies advanced by 
mobilizing scientists from various fields of study and from 
multiple countries, leaves an indelible mark. If the Official history 
of Ultra is ever published, then a true assessment can be made. It 
is quite possible that an entire revision of assumptions and 
conclusions about World War Two is needed (Whiting, p. 131). Since 
Bletchley had intercepted and deciphered much of the enemy's 
wireless cryptography throughout most of the war, there is no 
escaping a reexamination of almost all the important decisions 
made by Western statesman and generals. The matter of who knew 
what and when obviously would be of paramount importance 
(Laqueur, p. 18; Bennett, p.416). Nevertheless, it is an inescapable 
fact that assembling an intellectual-pool of scientists to solve a 
problem or to advance a technology can be of inestimable value.
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